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DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Mid-Orange C orrcctionnl Facility, has commcnced the 
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instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondelit made on 
February 2 1,2006 in which petitioner was denied discretionary release on parole. Petitioner 
is serving an indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life pursuant to a conviction after trial of 
the crime of murder in the second degree’. Petitioner indicates that he has accepted f i l l  
responsibility for his crime. He maintains that he has attempted to take advantage of the 
therapeutic, vocational and educational programs available to him. He obtained a certificate 
in paralegal studies and has taken college courses. He avers that of all the people considered 
for parole, he belongs to a group that is the least likely to recidivate if released, since persons 
convicted of homicide have a low rate of recidivism. He maintains that the determination 
of the Parole Board is not supported by any evidence, let alone substantial evidence. In his 
view, there is no proof that he would recidivate if released; and that no proof that he currently 
has a propensity to commit a crime. In support of this contention he makes reference to his 
institutional programing. He criticizes the Parole Board for improperly devoting too much 
time during the parole interview discussing the crime for which he was incarcerated, and 
ignnring andlor down playing hiq mitstnndtinr - institiitiond record Tn petitinner’s view, by 
reason of the absence of aggravating circumstances which could properly preclude release, 
he is entitled to be released immediately. 
The petitioner contends that the Parole Board has violated his right to Equal 
Protection under the law, as he is similarly situated to all prior inmates who have been 
Petitioner was also convicted of the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the 1 
second degree, for which a definite term of one year was imposed. 
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granted release. He argues that the parole denial determination was governed by an Executive 
policy to deny parole to all violent felony offenders; and was the result of political pressure. 
Petitioner further asserts that the determination violated his right to due process of law. As 
;i part ofthis argumcnt, hc maintain.: that the Parole Board failkd to ;irticuliItc: a ratioid b i i h  
for its decision. Petitioner also asserts that the Parole Board relied upon incorrect 
information in that Commissioner Vizzie commented during the parole interview that this 
was his fifth time in state prison, when in fact it was his first time. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
“Parole denied. You argued with the victim and then shot him 
in the chest with a handgun. The victim was killed. The record 
reflects that you and the victim had an ongoing dispute. 
Consideration has been given to your program participation and 
acceptable disciplinary record. Following review and 
consideration, this parole panel has concluded that discretionary 
release is inappropriate as it would deprecate the severity of the 
instant offense and serve to undermine respect for the law.” 
The Court must first address a threshold issue. Simultaneously with the filing of the 
petition in this matter the petitioner made a motion for discovery pursuant to CPLR 5 408, 
including a request to conduct depositions of members of the Division of Parole and to serve 
a demand for the production of documents. The petitioner also wishes to identi@ former 
inmates similarly situated to him who were granted parole, to assist him in establishing the 
merit of his equal protection argument. In addition, separate and apart from the motion for 
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discovery, the petitioner has served a notice to admit pursuant to CPLR 3 123 upon the 
respondent. The notice to admit required respondent to admit or deny the following matters 
(which are presented here in summary form): that petitioner has satisfied all of the 
rehabilitative goals set for him by the New York State Department of Correctional Services; 
that there is strong support in the community for petitioner’s release; that respondent’s 
determination does not include a probabilistic assessment as to the likelihood that petitioner 
will recidivate if released.; that the New York State Board of Parole’s determination is not 
supported by any evidence, let alone substantial evidence; that respondent has granted parole 
to numerous persons convicted of the same offense as the petitioner here; that respondent has 
not articulated a rational basis for denying petitioner parole while, at the same time, it has 
granted parole to persons who are similarly situated to the petitioner; that respondent has 
allowed political pressure to infect its decision-making process; that respondent used 
incorrect information to sway their determination when [the Parole Board] noted on the 
record that “this is your fifth time in state prison”. 
Under CPLR fj 408, discovery is permitted only in the discretion of the Court. The 
Court finds that petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable need for the conduct of 
discovery proceedings, whether by deposition or through production of documents (see 
Matter of Zulu v Eaan, 1 AD3d 649,649 [3rd Dept., 20031). The Court finds that the motion 
must, in all respects, be denied. 
With regard to petitioner’s notice to admit, as recently stated by the Appellate 
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Division, “‘[tlhe underlying purpose of a notice to admit is to eliminate from disputc those 
matters about which there can be no controversy; it is not to be used to request admission of 
material issues or ultimate issues or facts’” (Eddvville Corporation v Relvea, 35 AD3d 1063, 
1066 [3rd Dept., 20061, quoting Howlan v Rosol, 139 AD2d 799, 802 [3rd Dept., 19881 and 
citing CPLR 3 123 [a]). In this instance, petitioner attempted to utilize the notice to admit to 
request admission of material issues or ultimate issues or facts. The Court finds that the 
demands contained in petitioner’s notice to admit were improper. Under the circumstances, 
respondent’s response to the notice to admit was proper. 
Turning to the merits, as stated in Executive Law $2594 (2) (c) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
comidered: (i) the institiitional record including proeram goal9 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s 
representative [I” (Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A]). 
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“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable” (Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board of Parole, 189 
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
157 AD2d 944). If the parole board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory 
requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (see Ristau v. 
Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality 
bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate 
judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting 
Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence 
of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made 
by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 
726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview revealc that. in addition to the inctmt offense. attention was paid to q.uch 
factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, vocational skills acquired while in prison, 
letters submitted in support of his release, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon release. 
Thc dccisioii WAS suffcicntly detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial 
of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $259-i (see Matter of Whitehead 
v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of 
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Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931): It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole 
Board consider the seriousness of the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of 
Wcir v. New York State Division of Parolc. 205 AD2d 906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter 
of Sinopoli v. New York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v 
Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or 
give equal weight to each factor that it considered in determining the inmate’s application, 
or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Farid v Travis, supra; Matter of Moore v New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 233 AD2d 653 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter of C‘ollado v New York 
State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 92 1 [3rd Dept., 200 11). Nor must the parole board recite 
the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of Executive Law $ 2594 (2) (c) 
(A) (see Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3‘d Dept., 20061). In other words, 
“[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis 
on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a 
petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether 
the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,’ whether his or her 
‘release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate 
the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New 
York State Division of Parole, 3 AD3d 8 16 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 
[2] [c] [A], other citations omitted). 
The Court notes that because there was no formal evidentiary hearing in this instance, 
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the standard of review is not whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence, 
but rather whether the determination is in violation of lawful procedure, affected by an error 
of law, arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion (see CPLR 7803 [3]; Matter of Pel1 
v Bd. of Educ., 34 NY2d 222 [ 19741). 
The record does not support petitioner’s assertion that the decision was predetermined 
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy (and/or through political pressure) 
mandating denial of parole to all violent felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no 
merit to the argument (see Matter of Lue-Shinn v Pataki, 301 AD2d 827, 828 [3rd Dept., 
20031; Mnttcr v l ‘ l ’ c ~ ~  1 Stiilc ul‘Nc\\ ’ 1 ’ d  F)il isiuii ~ d ’ l ’ i i ~ d ~ ~ ,  294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 
20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293 AD2d 800, 801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Little v 
Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd Dept., 20051, Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd 
Dept., 20061). 
With respect to petitioner’s argument that the Appeals Unit failed to issue a timely 
decision, the Court observes that such a failure does not operate to invalidate the underlying 
adrnini<trative deciqicrn. The sole conseqiience is to permit the petitioner to deem his or her 
administrative remedy to be exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seek judicial 
review of the underlying determination (E 9 NYCRR 5 8006.4 [c]; Graham v New York 
State Division of Parole, 269 AD2d 628 [3rd Dept, 20001, lv denied 95 NY2d 753; People ex 
rela Tykr v Travis, 269 AD2d 636 [3rd ncpt., 30001). 
Turning to petitioner’s argument that the Parole Board relied upon erroneous 
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information (that this was his fifth state term of imprisonment), the Court notes that 
Commissioner Vizzie made the following comment during the parole interview: "This is your 
fifth time in state prison. First felony conviction ..." While it is clear that Commissioner 
Vizzie made a mistatement of fact, it is equally evident that if this was petitioner's first 
felony conviction (which it was) that he could not possibly have been incarcerated in state 
prison on four prior occasions. Moreover, as respondent points out, petitioner failed to 
correct this mistatement of fact during the parole interview. The Court finds that petitioner 
failed to establish that the alleged incorrect fact resulted in a violation of petitioner's 
constitutional rights or that they involved matters which affected respondent's decision to 
deny parole (see, A f 3 t u  d ' l b s i i c \  i h c i i  '1 irilL 3iaic BUUJ d ' f k d c ,  267 AD2d 648,649 
[3rd Dept., 19991; h l u c r  o l ' l b ~ ~ c l  i at.\\ \ c)A Siaic M. ~ ' ~ ' J ~ u J L ,  272 AD2d 731 [3rd 
Dept., 20001; Matter of Richburg v New York State Division of Parole, 284 AD2d 685,686 
[3rd Dept., 20011); Matter of Morel v Travis, 278 AD2d 580 [3rd Dept., 20001, appeal 
dismissed 96 NY2d 752 [2001]). 
With respect to petitioner's equal protectinn arpirnent. the Foiirtcenth Amendment 
ofthe Federal Constitution forbids States from denying to any person within their jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws, but does not prevent the States from making reasonable 
classifications among persons (Western 24 S.1- 4 .  C'o v Rd nf Fqualimtion, 45 1 US 648,68 
L Ed 2d 5 14, 523 101 S Ct 2070 [ 19811). Where the action under review does not involve 
a suspect class or fundamental right, it is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny, but rather is 
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examined using the rational basis standard to determine if the action violated the equal 
protection clause (see, ~ ~ ~ I ~ w I ~ u ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  11~1. o l ' l<~~ i i i . c i i i c i \ l  3 1 ~ 1 r w .  427 US 307,49 L Ed 2d 
520,524,96 S Ct 2562 and Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242,250). In this instance there is 
simply no evidence of either selective or disparate treatment or that the respondent's 
determination was motivated by impermissible considerations (E Giordano v City of New 
York, 274 F3d 740,75 1 [2nd Cir., 20011). 
With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to 
due process, the Court observes that it has been repeatedly held that a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest does not arise under Executive Law 5 2594, since it does not create 
an entitlement to, or legitimate expectation of release (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 169 [2"d 
Cir., 200 13; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40 [2"d Cir., 200 11, at p. 44; Paunetto v Hammock (5 16 
F Supp 1367 [US Dist. Ct., SD NY, 19811; Washington v White, 805 F Supp 191 [SDNY, 
19921). The Court, accordingly, finds no due process violation. 
In addition, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 
months) is within the Roarcl's discretion and was supported by the record (see, Matter of 
Tatta v State of New York. Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 
98 NY2d 604). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and finds them to be without 
merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
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lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED, that petitioner’s motion for leave to conduct discovery proceedings be 
and hereby is denied; and it is further 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are 
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this 
Decision/Order/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this 
Decision/Order with notice of entry. 
ENTER 
I ’  
< - ( . - ,-, 
i 
~  ’ - 
suyieint: C‘0Ul-L JUbLiCG 1 j? - 
May 16 ,2007 
Troy, New York a 
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